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Essay
E
vidence that neuroscience 
improves our understanding of 
economic phenomena [1–4] 
comes from a broad array of novel 
experimental findings, including 
demonstrations of brain regions 
that guide responses to fair [5,6] 
and unfair [7] social interactions, 
that resolve uncertainty during 
decision making [8], that track loss 
aversion [9] and subjective value 
[10], and that encode willingness 
to pay [11,12] and reward error 
signals [13,14]. Yet, neuroeconomics 
has been characterized as a faddish 
juxtaposition, not an integration, 
of disparate domains [15]. More 
damningly, critics have charged that 
neuroscience and economics are 
fundamentally incompatible [16], 
an argument that resonates with 
many social scientists. Economics 
thrived for centuries in the absence 
of neuroscience and some economists 
argue that existing neuroeconomics 
research is not useful to mainstream 
economics [17,18].
We reject the fundamental charge 
that neuroscience cannot influence 
economic modeling, even in principle, 
and focus on two criticisms of 
integrating these fields, which we label 
the Behavioral Sufficiency and Emergent
Phenomenon arguments. We show here 
that these arguments contain hidden 
assumptions that render them unsound 
within the practical constraints of 
science.
We go on to explore two interrelated 
questions: is there a unique niche for 
a field of neuroeconomics, and, if 
so, what are its proper foundational 
principles? We do not rely on the 
recent demonstrations of brain systems 
that support economic behavior nor 
recount the valid concerns about 
potential technological constraints of 
neuroscience. Rather, we attempt to 
clarify the necessary foundations for 
neuroeconomics research [19–21], for 
which we identify two core principles, 
Mechanistic Convergence and Biological
Plausibility.
We then ask how information about 
neural mechanisms improves the 
predictive and explanatory power of 
economic models. Importantly, the 
points we raise here recapitulate both 
the cognitive revolution [22] and the 
subsequent intertwining of cognitive 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience 
[23,24]. We believe that the seemingly 
disparate neural and social sciences 
have much to gain from each other.
Neuroeconomics: Promise 
Unfulfilled?
We define neuroeconomics as 
the convergence of the neural 
and social sciences, applied to the 
understanding and prediction of 
decisions about rewards [25], such as 
money, food, information acquisition, 
physical pleasure or pain, and social 
interactions. Neuroscience brings a 
wealth of technological approaches, 
including brain imaging [e.g., 
functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI)], lesion studies, 
molecular biology, pharmacology, and 
electrophysiology. Economics adds 
conceptual principles (e.g., rationality 
and utility), statistical techniques, 
and rigorous modeling. Psychology 
provides evidence for decision biases 
such as heuristics, framing effects, and 
emotional influences. Finally, genetics 
[26,27], computer science [28], and 
philosophy [21,29,30] contribute to 
neuroeconomic research. Numerous 
reviews summarize research at the 
intersection of these fields [1,3,31–35].
Among neuroscientists, the 
incorporation of economic concepts 
has generated much excitement. 
Economic models make assumptions 
about “covert preferences” [36], or 
value judgments, because measuring 
actual preferences with only behavioral 
methods is difficult [37]. But 
neuroscience may provide a means 
to measure those covert preferences 
[18], potentially eliminating the need 
for those assumptions. More broadly, 
neuroscience often incorporates 
economic models to explain brain 
function, both when investigating 
decision making under risky conditions 
[38–40] and examining information 
acquisition during learning [41,42]. 
Based on the breadth of research so 
far, introducing economic concepts has 
led to clear advances within social and 
decision neuroscience.
Nonetheless, detractors dispute 
the value of neuroeconomics, often 
citing poor statistical practice [17], 
the answering of irrelevant questions 
[16], skepticism about the relevance 
of nonhuman animal studies [16], 
and the interpretational difficulties 
associated with neuroimaging data 
[43]. Whereas neuroscience data is 
compelling because it seems to reveal 
previously inaccessible truths [44,45], 
the lack of functional specificity of 
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many brain regions (at least at the level 
accessible to common neuroimaging 
techniques) often precludes strong 
conclusions about links between brain 
regions and behavior [46]. Even where 
neuroscience can ask well-formed 
questions, the economic literature 
may have different disciplinary 
conventions (e.g., statistical analyses 
and decision models) that preclude 
ready translation between the fields 
[17,18]. Without a common language 
or principles to bridge the disciplines 
[19,20], neuroeconomics may become 
increasingly brain-centric. 
Moreover, neuroscientists and 
social scientists work with different 
methods and datasets. Neuroscientists 
frequently require expensive hardware, 
use invasive techniques, and draw data 
from a small sample of humans or 
animals. Social scientists, in contrast, 
generally measure information 
about choice preferences (or other 
forms of behavior) through relatively 
inexpensive laboratory testing, and 
often use data from observations in 
natural environments (e.g., housing 
prices), across large and diverse 
samples of subjects.  These many 
disciplinary contrasts have led critics 
to make two arguments, which we here 
label Behavioral Sufficiency and Emergent
Phenomenon, that neuroscience data 
cannot influence economic modeling, 
even in principle.
Arguments Against 
Neuroeconomics
Behavioral Sufficiency. Some theorists 
argue that economic hypotheses cannot 
be falsified using neuroscience data 
[16,47]. Since economic models make 
no assumptions about the mechanisms 
underlying behavior, the argument 
goes, no data about those mechanisms 
could confirm or refute any economic 
model [16]. To falsify an economic 
model, researchers must manipulate 
some environmental factor and observe 
a change in behavior contrary to the 
model’s predictions. In this Behavioral
Sufficiency argument, behavioral data 
are both necessary and sufficient to 
evaluate the validity of economic 
models, leaving only brain function or 
clinical disorders for neuroeconomics 
to address. 
This argument builds from the 
concept of revealed preference in 
economics [48,49]. Economic models 
emphasize observable choice data to 
construct sets of preferences sufficient 
to model and predict choice [21]. For 
example, consider the hypothesis that 
affective feelings (e.g., sadness) exert 
an effect on decisions [50]. Although 
this hypothesis is a natural candidate 
for models inspired by neuroscience, 
in that it posits specific intervening 
states that influence choice, at present 
identifying those states requires self-
reported behavioral data (e.g., feelings 
of sadness), not neuroscience proxies 
(e.g., amygdala activation). Even if 
nothing were known about the neural 
mechanisms of emotion, choice, or 
their interaction, behavioral research 
could reveal that sadness biases 
decisions [51]. Models can incorporate 
other affective states (e.g., anger or 
fear) by inducing feelings and then 
testing the consequences on decisions. 
In all cases, purely behavioral data 
(the subjects’ responses to induced 
states) would be sufficient, in principle, 
to identify relationships between 
independent variables associated with 
an environmental manipulation and 
a dependent variable associated with 
a real-world decision measure. Thus, 
critics argue, behavioral models, not 
mechanism-based models, can facilitate 
prediction.
Researchers can collect behavioral 
data from hundreds of individuals at 
relatively little cost. For many economic 
questions, data from laboratory 
experiments merge with observations 
of real-world behavior, providing 
important checks on the validity of 
research phenomena. In contrast, 
neuroscience experiments require 
large-scale capital investments and 
specialized skills for data collection 
and analyses, and necessarily constrain 
participants’ behavior dramatically: 
body movements, face-to-face 
interactions, and verbal expressions 
of decisions are all restricted. The 
small sample size of neuroscience 
experiments complicates analyses 
of individual differences, and even 
well-conducted, adequately powered 
experiments may lead to equivocal 
conclusions, because of inherent 
limitations in the experimental 
methods [43,52] and incomplete 
knowledge about underlying brain 
function [46]. In short, given 
the challenges of neuroscience 
experimentation compared to 
traditional social science methods, 
the Behavioral Sufficiency argument 
seems to sound the death knell for 
neuroeconomics.
Yet, the simplicity of this argument 
belies a hidden premise that undercuts 
its practical validity. We do not 
disagree that researchers could falsify 
any possible economic model using 
behavioral data and may predict 
behavioral phenomena without 
an understanding of mechanism. 
However, Behavioral Sufficiency rests on 
the premise that the data necessary 
to falsify or support a model  can, in 
practice, be identified and collected. 
Many important decision phenomena 
require a wide range of tests for their 
experimentation. For the hypothesis 
described earlier [50], researchers 
could test effects of a whole range 
of affective states, such as anger, 
depression, elation, and sleep 
deprivation. With comprehensive 
data about how preferences change 
across these states, theorists could 
validate, reject, or refine relevant 
economic models, but accumulating 
those data would be time-consuming 
and expensive, especially when testing 
interacting factors (e.g., the effects of 
depression in adolescents upon delay 
discounting). Thus, the argument 
succeeds in principle but fails in 
practice: no researcher—indeed, no 
collection of researchers—can obtain 
all possible data about all possible 
behaviors.
These practical limitations leave 
an opening for neuroscience data 
to influence economic modeling 
by directing the course of research. 
Continuing the above example, 
long-standing neuroscience work 
distinguishes emotional states as 
resulting from different mechanisms, 
with disgust, pain, and fear, for 
example, all reflecting different 
neural substrates [53,54], despite 
some superficial similarities. So, 
neuroscience data that map particular 
affective systems (e.g., posterior 
rather than anterior insula) to specific 
forms of choice (e.g., purchasing 
decisions) may suggest new directions 
for subsequent behavioral research 
[12]. We believe that neuroscience 
could make important contributions 
to economics by improving the efficacy 
(both in falsification and explanation) 
of behavioral research. 
Emergent Phenomenon. A second 
criticism focuses on the methods of 
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place human (or monkey or rodent) 
subjects in a mock economic setting 
to elicit a desired behavior—such 
as differential framing of gains and 
losses [9,55], rejection of unfair 
offers [7], or incentivized memory 
retention [56]—and identify its 
neural correlates. Neuroscientists 
make similar extrapolations from 
animal studies when monkeys make 
decisions regarding juice [10] or rats 
make decisions involving drops of 
sucrose [57]. In effect, these studies 
create a simplified “toy model” of a 
real-world phenomenon in order to 
test hypotheses about an underlying 
mechanism. Toy models have long 
been used in both the natural sciences 
(e.g., placing small-scale structures 
into wind tunnels to understand 
fluid mechanics) and the biological 
sciences (e.g., in vitro studies to 
understand cellular properties), 
but economists have only relatively 
recently started to use them, creating 
simple markets (or other economic 
institutions) within the laboratory 
[58,59] and inducing subjects to 
behave in a self-interested manner 
reflective of real-world behavior. 
These markets obeyed basic research 
principles: participants received full 
and accurate information, decisions 
had meaningful (usually monetary) 
consequences, and deception 
was prohibited. Neuroeconomic 
experiments typically follow these 
principles. In recent studies of 
purchasing decisions, for example, 
subjects had the opportunity to spend 
real money and receive real goods 
(e.g., iPods and candy) in return 
[11,12]. Researchers extrapolate that 
the neural mechanisms recruited in 
such laboratory studies also underlie 
real-world purchasing behavior.
The validity of a toy model rests on 
the assumption that the principles 
of interest are maintained from the 
laboratory setting to the natural 
environment. When the physical 
principles change—as when moving 
from small-scale models of buildings 
to their real-world counterparts—an 
extrapolation from toy models may 
have disastrous consequences [60]. 
Neuroeconomic experiments can 
suffer from similar problems: principles 
that shape behavior in the laboratory 
(e.g., experimenter demand effects) 
do not necessarily influence real-
world phenomena (e.g., amount 
of charitable giving). Suppose that 
an economist and neuroscientist 
create a mock retirement-planning 
fMRI experiment to identify ways 
to encourage participation in a 
retirement savings plan and discover 
patterns of neural activation that 
predict decisions to save money. Critics 
charge that because information about 
neural mechanisms was collected 
from a few dozen subjects, it cannot 
generate a better understanding of 
retirement planning behavior for 
millions of adults. In this argument, 
the underlying mechanisms have no 
bearing on economic theories that 
describe aggregate data. Similar and 
notable claims have been made within 
economics about market phenomena 
[61]. We refer to this as the Emergent
Phenomenon argument: the denial 
that an understanding of mechanism 
has relevance for understanding 
phenomena at the aggregate societal 
level. Similar reasoning pervades 
criticisms of behavioral economics. 
Consistent with substantial evidence 
that emergence is common within 
complex economic systems [62,63], 
this argument limits the scope of 
neuroscience data from generalizing to 
higher-level phenomena. 
The Emergent Phenomenon argument, 
however, rests on the assumption 
that emergence not only exists but 
subsumes any influences from lower 
levels. Yet, as has been argued with 
respect to macroeconomic modeling 
[64], emergence may not be ubiquitous 
among economic phenomena. 
Microeconomic theory invokes the 
concept of a general equilibrium [65] 
to explain aggregate market outcomes 
based on individual behavior and 
preferences, a foundational concept 
that explains higher-level outcomes 
from lower-level data. Consider 
drug addiction, a social problem of 
increasing interest to economists 
[66,67]. No scientist claims that 
understanding the neural mechanisms 
of addiction provides a complete 
explanation of drug abuse, but that 
understanding undeniably clarifies 
both the etiology of addiction, as 
evident in genetic influences [68] 
and the success of interventions like 
nicotine patches, leading to clear 
changes in public policy. Other 
economic phenomena may have only 
limited emergence. For example, 
retirement planning in older adults is 
likely influenced by general cognitive 
decline with aging [69], and the 
financial decisions of teenagers reveal 
a broad pattern of impulsivity, which 
reflects delayed neural development 
of the prefrontal cortex compared to 
other brain systems [70]. That some 
economic phenomena have some 
emergent properties restricts the 
explanatory power of hierarchical, 
mechanistic models, but does not 
render those models logically invalid.
Social science models are now 
increasingly likely to incorporate 
some mechanistic explanations that 
account for effects across levels. As an 
example, economic experiments aimed 
at implementing general equilibrium 
theory in the laboratory use individual 
portfolio choices to explain financial 
market behavior [71]. To the extent 
that researchers can more accurately 
specify the mechanisms underlying 
the behavior of an individual, some 
phenomena of interest to economists 
will be better modeled. A core goal of 
neuroeconomics will be identifying 
those economic phenomena to which 
neuroscience can be most profitably 
applied.
Foundations of Neuroeconomics
Mechanistic Convergence in experiments. 
Behavioral economic research [72,73] 
could proceed without neuroscience, 
but we believe that neuroscience data 
will increase the efficiency of this 
research. Specifically, via Mechanistic
Convergence, neuroscience experiments 
can guide the generation and direction 
of future behavioral studies with a 
multi-stage “behavior-to-brain-to-
behavior” approach. 
By identifying interesting choice 
behavior and creating models for 
the associated cognitive processes, 
neuroeconomics research can 
generate better paradigms for human 
neuroimaging studies and target 
behavior to replicate in animal 
and clinical studies (behavior). By 
grounding conclusions about brain 
function in behavioral effects such 
as choice parameters or individual 
decisions, neuroeconomics can 
unify cognitive and neural theories 
of behavior [18]. Knowledge about 
the underlying mechanisms (brain)
can generate novel hypotheses about 
external modulating factors, which 
in turn can be generalized to new 
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environments (behavior). Well-designed 
neuroscience experiments can speed 
the course of behavioral research, 
effectively using mechanistic knowledge 
to target observable behaviors for 
subsequent experimentation. This 
use of convergent evidence from 
neuroscience refines and reduces the 
number of experiments necessary for 
understanding individual behavior.
Neural and behavioral studies 
should interact to identify interesting 
phenomena, to suggest mechanisms 
that underlie those phenomena, and 
to map out the biological substrates 
that support those mechanisms 
[18]. This iterative approach is also 
important when multiple decision or 
psychological processes could lead to 
the same choice behavior [20]. For 
example, temptation (e.g., purchasing 
a sale item because it is a good deal) 
and regret (e.g., purchasing a sale item 
to avoid future regret) are different 
subjective phenomena but can lead 
to similar purchasing decisions [74], 
despite likely having distinct neural 
substrates [75]. Neuroscience data 
that distinguish these affective states 
can guide the construction of new 
behavioral experiments and more-
targeted hypotheses. Such data could 
differentiate properties of regret 
and temptation, along with related 
phenomena that may share some of 
their neural mechanisms, increasing 
the efficiency of behavioral research. 
Biological Plausibility in models.
Aside from producing new hypotheses, 
neurobiological knowledge can also 
introduce constraints. Models of 
neural function have guided theories 
of executive control and decision 
making [76–82]. Likewise, integrating 
psychological concepts into models 
is not new to economics [83,84]. We 
argue that neuroscience can inspire 
models of behavior that conform to 
our current scientific knowledge, 
i.e., behavioral models that have 
Biological Plausibility. The advantages 
of mechanistic knowledge are well 
documented in the psychological, 
philosophical, and economic literatures 
[19,85]. For example, a combination 
of rodent [57,86], nonhuman primate 
[87,88], and human studies [41,42,89] 
have led to theorizing about the role 
of dopamine in reward processing 
and prediction error. To the extent 
that neuroeconomics provides insight 
into the mechanisms guiding different 
forms of utility, such knowledge 
constrains candidate models of 
individuals’ choice processing. 
Yet, only a handful of microeconomic 
models strive for biological plausibility. 
The dual-systems framework postulates 
that choice reflects the interaction of 
two distinct neurocognitive systems 
with complementary strengths 
and weakness [83]. One common 
dichotomy separates automatic or “hot” 
affective processes from controlled or 
“cold” cognitive processes, and similar 
divisions are used in several economic 
models [67,90–93]. Critically, the 
dual-systems models are compelling 
because they are intuitively plausible 
and supported by both human [55,94] 
and animal [95,96] neuroscience 
data. These models generate testable 
hypotheses about the nature and 
timing of interactions between 
competing brain systems, which may, 
of course, lead to the rejection of these 
models. For example, recent studies 
suggest that a more unified set of 
neural processes support the evaluation 
of options and decisions [9,97,98]. 
Constraining theories in accordance 
with our best neurobiological 
knowledge is critical for moving 
beyond behavioral conflations of 
several distinct affective states. Full 
understanding of the mechanisms 
of choice will require more precise 
characterization of precipitating, 
modulating, and inhibiting factors 
[85], potentially through neuroscience 
data.
We note that most current 
neuroscientific methods provide only 
coarse information about mechanism. 
The dominant technique, fMRI, 
provides temporal information about 
the relative metabolic demand of 
populations of hundreds of thousands 
of neurons [43]. Models based on 
these methods must make simplifying 
assumptions: e.g., region A activates
as if it is modulated by region B.
Note that this simplification is similar 
to the aforementioned “revealed 
preference” foundation of economic 
choice models: the actual mechanistic 
relation between regions A and B is 
not being modeled, just as the actual 
computations underlying preferences 
are generally ignored. New methods in 
fMRI, notably those that characterize 
how information shapes connections 
between regions [99], promise to 
create integrated models that include 
both a description of information flow 
among brain regions and the effects 
of behavior upon the connections 
between those regions. Integrating 
techniques within single studies, such 
as fMRI and genetics [27,100], will be 
critical for producing mechanistically 
complete and biologically plausible 
explanations of behaviors.
Conclusion
Neuroeconomics is at a crossroads, 
poised to demonstrate that 
neuroscience can provide the same 
types of benefits it has long received 
from the social sciences. Ideas from 
game theory and expected utility theory 
can explain the responses of individual 
neurons to incoming information 
[2]. Similarly, aspects of utility theory 
can be used to describe the activity 
of populations of neurons within the 
brain’s reward system [101]. There is 
also an opportunity for the axiomatic 
approach of decision theory to explain 
decision-making mechanisms [20], 
such as building from the response 
properties of dopaminergic neurons 
[102]. Without comparable examples 
of neuroscience data contributing 
to economic models, critics could 
argue that neuroeconomics research 
is a brain-centric enterprise that 
incorporates ideas from the social 
sciences without reciprocation [16,17]. 
We agree that neuroeconomic 
research has indeed been brain-centric, 
but stress that it need not remain so. 
The core criticisms of neuroeconomics 
constrain the practice of this field, 
but do not render it meaningless. 
Clear foundational principles remain. 
Neuroeconomics via Mechanistic
Convergence can more efficiently direct 
the course of future behavioral studies. 
As an historical parallel, economists 
have explored psychological concepts 
(e.g., emotional influences on decision 
making) for many years [84,103–105], 
sparking a broad array of new 
behavioral experiments and theories. 
Furthermore, neuroeconomics can 
facilitate the creation and testing 
of models that adhere to Biological
Plausibility. Social scientists (and 
neuroscientists) should not treat 
decision-making phenomena 
as irreducible and mechanism-
independent. Instead, the joint 
investigation of brain and behavior 
will lead to greater success than either 
discipline could achieve in isolation.  PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org 2352 November 2008  |  Volume 6  |  Issue 11  |  e298
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